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ABSTRACT
A considerable amount of uncertainty surrounds life expectancy, the average length of life. The standard
deviation in adult life span is about 15 years in the U.S., and theory and evidence suggest it is costly.
I calibrate a utility-theoretic model of preferences over length of life and show that one less year in
standard deviation is worth about half a mean life year. Differences in the standard deviation exacerbate
cross-sectional differences in life expectancy between the U.S. and other industrialized countries, between
rich and poor countries, and among poor countries. But accounting for the cost of life-span variance
also appears to amplify recently discovered patterns of convergence in world average human well-being.
This is partly for methodological reasons and partly because unconditional variance in human length
of life, primarily the component due to infant mortality, has exhibited even more convergence than
life expectancy. Sustained reductions in the standard deviation of adult life span, which have largely
ceased among advanced nations, accounted for about 15 percent of the total economic value of gains
against mortality in the U.S. prior to 1950 but only about 5 percent since.
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Suppose that for a price, individuals could choose among several industrialized countries which
would be their life-long home starting from birth. Infant mortality is negligible, and the only
socioeconomic element that diﬀers across regions is adult survivorship, which depends only on
physical location.1 If the choice is between living in country A, where life expectancy at birth,
e0, is 80 years, or country B, where e0 = 78 years, how much would an individual be willing to
pay to be born and live in country A instead of B? Economists have developed an answer to this
question based on how people respond to varying degrees of mortality risk. According to the review
by Tolley, Kenkel and Fabian (1994), the average individual should value an extra year of life at
about $200,000 today after adjusting for inﬂation. Then we might expect that he or she might be
willing to pay about $40,000 today, or the present discounted value of those two extra year of life
expectancy at birth, to live in country A rather than B.
In this paper, I argue that one needs to know more than just the average length of life to make
this comparison. Suppose length of life is also more uncertain in country B, where there is a 20
percent chance of death before age 65, as opposed to only a 12 percent chance in country A. Put
diﬀerently, suppose the standard deviation of length of adult life is 15 years in country B but only
13 in country B. How much would an individual pay to live in country A now? As I will show,
lowering the standard deviation by two years should be worth about the same as attaining one
additional year in mean length of life. So a reasonable answer is about $60,000 in total to live in A
rather than B, or an extra $20,000 to avoid the heightened uncertainty in life span.
Valuing the spread in length of life to arrive at an answer like this could be done in three
diﬀerent ways. One could directly ask individuals about their preferences over volatility in life
span. Alternatively, if there were a natural experiment that shifted the variance in length of life,
one could examine revealed preferences. Finally, one can produce an estimate by calibrating a
model and measuring the spread in a tractable way. Part of the problem with both of the ﬁrst two
options is that it is hard to conceive of a shock to length of life that shifts only the variance and
1In reality, survivorship and socioeconomic status are closely interrelated. As I discuss in section 4.2, members
of higher socioeconomic strata enjoy life spans that are longer on average and also less variable. But no amount of
income or wealth can prolong life indeﬁnitely or remove uncertainty altogether; all strata are subject to the cost of
uncertain life span, albeit to varying degree.
2not the mean.2 Previous attempts at the ﬁrst option have thus been limited in scope and results,
and I know of no studies that follow the second. In this paper, I perform the last option, recovering
a purely theoretical value for uncertainty in life span that is fully consistent with current economic
thinking. It is similar in spirit to the ambitious theoretical work of Bommier (2006) but diﬀers
in that its focus is on empirical calibration. By revealing a large baseline estimate of the cost of
uncertain life span, this paper sets the table for future studies of individuals’ revealed preferences.
Choosing a convenient measure of the uncertainty is a key step. We can quantify uncertainty
in human life span by interpreting the deaths in a life table as probability densities. Each panel in
Figure 1 displays a column of the 1900 and 2000 U.S. life tables for both sexes combined presented
by Bell and Miller (2005).3 The solid line in panel A displays the density function of life spans for
the U.S. in 2000, which is a skew-left distribution around a mode of 85 years with a small spike
at infant mortality. The unconditional mean of this distribution, also called period life expectancy
at birth, or e0, is about 77 years.4 As is plainly visible in panel A, there is considerable variation
around the mean even if we omit infant mortality, which is ﬁxed at age 0. Edwards and Tuljapurkar
(2005) argue that the standard deviation in life span after age 10, S10, is a good measure of this
dispersion in adult life span.5 It will also turn out to be conveniently tractable in the model I
introduce in this paper. In 2000, S10 was about 15 years in the U.S.
Panel A in Figure 1 also reveals massive temporal change in this distribution. In 1900, life was
much shorter on average, with e0 = 48, and infant mortality was considerably higher. We can also
2The estimates of the value of a life year examined by Tolley, Kenkel and Fabian (1994) and others typically derive
from economic responses to mortality shocks that change both the mean and the variance simultaneously, usually an
on-the-job risk of death that is compensated with a market wage. If these shocks are small, they reveal the expected
discounted value of a life year conditional on both the mean and variance inherent in the typical survivorship schedule.
3Data prior to 1933, the ﬁrst year when all 48 states were included in the oﬃcial Death Registration Area (Haines,
2001), are less representative but still suggestive of early patterns.
4The mean length of life conditional on survival to any early age past infancy, say age 10, is not much diﬀerent at
M10 = e10 + 10 = 78. This is because infant mortality is relatively low.
5As Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005) explain, the standard deviation conditional on reaching practically any age
greater than or equal to 1 but less than say 25 is a stable measure of adult inequality in advanced countries today. Age
10 is a convenient cutoﬀ because it facilitates the examination of longer historical series or wider cross sections in which
premature mortality is more prevalent. When high, childhood mortality strongly aﬀects S1 and S5, while young adult
mortality can be missed entirely by S25. To be sure, opinions vary regarding the ideal type of measure of variability
in length of life. Wilmoth and Horiuchi (1999) and Fuchs and Ersner-Hershﬁeld (2008) prefer the interquartile range,
while Shkolnikov, Andreev and Begun (2003) favor the Gini. Preferable qualities of S10 and the IQR over the Gini
are that they are relatively invariant to trends in infant mortality, which is etiologically distinct from adult mortality,
and that they are invariant over additive translations of length of life. In a related paper, Edwards (2008) argues
that the latter characteristic is desirable given the standard utility-theoretic model of preferences used in this paper.
Trends in the IQR and S10 among industrialized countries over the last several centuries, as examined by Wilmoth
and Horiuchi (1999) and Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005), are essentially the same. As will become apparent in this
paper, a considerable advantage of S10 is its analytical tractability.
3see that adult life spans were much more uncertain than they are today, with S10 = 24, almost 10
years or some two-thirds higher. Figure 2 charts progress against uncertainty in adult life span, S10,
beneath gains in average life span, e0, over the last 150 years in Sweden, where historical statistics
are of high quality.6 Wilmoth and Horiuchi (1999) and Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005) investigate
in greater detail the long-term trends in variability among advanced countries. Monumental declines
in variance were achieved prior to the 1950s during the demographic and epidemiological transitions.
Reductions have largely stalled since then, even as life expectancy continues to increase. Today,
industrialized nations appear to be stuck with some uncertainty in life span, part of which is surely
inherent to living creatures and thus unavoidable. But as Edwards and Tuljapurkar reveal, there
are large and persistent diﬀerences today between high-variance countries, such as the U.S. and
France with S10 around 15 years, and low-variance countries like Sweden and Japan, who enjoy
levels of S10 near 13.
There are also large diﬀerences in S10 between rich and poor countries, although poor data
quality among the latter group reduces the precision of inferences. Table 2, to be discussed later,
shows that S10 has averaged around 20 years in Sub-Saharan Africa, where demographic and
epidemiologic transitions have not completed and infectious disease remains a leading cause of
death. In particular, the HIV/AIDS epidemic has increased variance in Africa beyond what it
would normally be at comparable stages of development. Countries still in the middle of their
demographic transitions but less hard hit by HIV/AIDS enjoy considerably lower levels of S10,
around 16.5 in the case of India and 14 in China, where population aging is commencing. While
infant mortality is negligible in most advanced economies, it has been and remains very high in
developing regions. As shown in Table 2, the chance of survivorship to age 10 in Sub-Saharan Africa
is estimated at only 82.7 percent today, compared with 99.2 percent in high income countries.
Are there welfare costs associated with S10 and infant mortality? What are the implications of
this broad deﬁnition of health inequality for assessing our progress against mortality, and for gauging
the value of continued progress?7 Answering these questions requires a theoretical framework, and
6As discussed by Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005), the trend toward lower variance is best characterized as a
one-time, if extended, event during the half century of epidemiological transition in industrialized countries, while
increases in life expectancy appear to be continuing apace. The decline of infectious disease as a leading cause of
death during the early part of the 20th century not only raised life expectancy but lowered the variability in adult life
spans considerably. After 1950, progress against chronic degenerative diseases like cancer and cardiovascular disease
appears to have shifted the survivorship curve outward rather than compressing it (Wilmoth, 2003).
7To be sure, population S10 eﬀectively conﬂates inequality as we would traditionally understand it, i.e., a diﬀerence
4I explore the cost of life-span variance using a standard model of intertemporal choice. Both model
and exercise are similar to those of Lucas (1987) in his classic assessment of the welfare cost of
business cycles, but the nature of the uncertainty I consider here is quite diﬀerent. A related paper
(Edwards, 2009a) considers an isomorphic problem that is more directly analogous to Lucas’s: the
cost of cyclical ﬂuctuations in mortality. Here, I am concerned with the cost of temporally static
uncertainty in length of life. Economically large variation in S10 across groups also raises an entirely
diﬀerent and interesting set of research questions concerning behavioral aspects. Potential causes
and consequences of uncertainty in length of life range broadly and are an interesting focus for
future eﬀorts. I discuss extant ﬁndings in this nascent area of inquiry but leave deeper questions
to future research eﬀorts.
As I show in this paper, the standard model of intertemporal optimization implies that individ-
uals should be risk averse over life span, and the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion in life span is
approximately the time discount rate. Since average life span seems to be increasing linearly over
time while the standard deviation around adult ages is now roughly ﬁxed, constant absolute risk
aversion is consistent with stable risk premia and thus is an intuitive result.8 As I discuss below,
risk aversion over life span ﬁts the relatively scant empirical evidence on stated preferences and
behavior in medical settings. Bommier (2006) presents a more detailed and general modeling of risk
aversion over life span that relaxes the assumption of additively separable preferences via another
curvature parameter, which he does not calibrate. If risk aversion is indeed greater than implied by
time discounting alone, as Bommier’s framework assumes implies, then my estimates will under-
state the true cost of life-span uncertainty. To be sure, much research on consumption and asset
pricing suggests that additive separability is too restrictive to explain many phenomena (Epstein
in mean life span between groups, with uncertainty in life span within groups or overall. While it is a measure of total
ex post inequality, labeling it as such may be misleading. As Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005) reveal, population-level
S10 masks substantial diﬀerences in both mean and variance in life span across population subgroups, which indicates
that inequality, uncertainty, and inequality in uncertainty are all at work.
8The intuition derives from an analogy to the relationship between time trends in aggregate consumption, risk
premia in consumption, and preferences over consumption, a relationship described by Campbell and Viceira (2002).
Log consumption is trending linearly upward over time, while ﬁnancial risk premia and the standard deviations
of asset returns and log consumption have remained roughly constant. Preferences over consumption that exhibit
constant relative risk aversion are consistent with these facts, and this is one reason why the familiar power utility
function is useful for modeling. By comparison, average length of life is trending upward at an approximately linear
rate, and the standard deviation has remained roughly constant since 1960. These facts imply that constant absolute
risk aversion over length of life would be consistent with these facts and with stable risk premia placed on length
of life. Although we technically do not observe the latter in any market, it seems reasonable to expect that they
probably are constant.
5and Zin, 1989, 1991; Browning, 1991). But Nordhaus (2003), Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005),
Murphy and Topel (2006), Hall and Jones (2007), and others in the subﬁeld on valuing longevity
extension all assume additive separability. My contribution follows in their footsteps and highlights
the independent and interesting cost of the variance in the widely used baseline model; it makes
no progress in answering similarly interesting questions about nonseparable preferences in theory
and practice.
For reasonable parameter values, the standard intertemporal model suggests that variance in
adult life span is quite costly, even when wealth can be fully and costlessly annuitized. Time
discounting also makes infant mortality extremely costly, considerably more so than is implied by
the sizable eﬀect of infant mortality on mean length of life alone. There are several implications of
my results. Each year in adult standard deviation is worth about half a year in the average; that
is, an individual would agree to give up half a year in mean life span to obtain a standard deviation
one year lower. In light of this, the value of diﬀerences in population health between low-average,
high-variance countries and high-average, low-variance countries is larger than the diﬀerences in life
expectancy alone. As I will show, the vast decreases in the standard deviation in the U.S. during
the 20th century represent roughly 15 percent of the total value of gains against mortality. Previous
estimates of the total economic value of mortality decline since 1900 (Nordhaus, 2003; Murphy and
Topel, 2006) typically account for all changes in the survivorship schedule, whether involving the
mean, variance, or higher moments, and thus are not biased downward. But my ﬁndings reveal that
a signiﬁcant amount of the gains was due to declines in variance, which have now largely ceased
(Edwards and Tuljapurkar, 2005).
In valuation studies where only life expectancy at birth is considered due to data limitations,
the omission of higher moments will bias results because variance is costly. In the ﬁnal section,
I revisit the eﬀorts of Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005), who reveal much global convergence
in world average “full income,” a measure of human well-being that incorporates the value of life
along with income per capita. Due to lack of data, their analysis accounts for the average but
not the variance in human life span. Incorporating new work by Edwards (2009b), I show that
accounting for life-span uncertainty ampliﬁes patterns of convergence in full income since 1970
for two reasons. Methodologically speaking, accounting for the presence of any variance, adult
or otherwise, increases the measured value of a given improvement in life expectancy, and the
6value is increasing in the variance. An observed gain in the mean length of life is thus worth
more to high-mortality countries, which also tend to be poor. In addition, there has been much
global convergence in infant mortality, more so even than in life expectancy (Moser, Shkolnikov
and Leon, 2005), although considerably less in S10. Infant mortality can be interpreted as the
most costly type of variance in total life span, and reductions strongly increase full income even
if life expectancy were held constant. Thus while higher mortality and variance in length of life
still disproportionately penalize the poor, the value of improvements in mortality works to reduce
global inequality in average well-being.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I contextualize this research by discussing
extant work on choice under uncertain survivorship and literature on the value of life and on
bequests. Section 3 presents the utility-theoretic model of the cost of uncertain length of adult life,
compares analytic approximations of the central result to numerical simulations of the full model,
and discusses the cost of infant mortality. In Section 4, I explore the implications of these insights,
such as for decomposing the value of mortality declines and assessing convergence in average human
well-being. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Background
A wealth of research exploring the valuation of life has produced many insights regarding the
willingness to pay for mortality reduction (Rosen, 1988; Viscusi, 1993; Johansson, 2002; Aldy and
Viscusi, 2003). Some investigators have examined the willingness to pay over historical periods
and across geographical boundaries (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003; Costa and Kahn, 2004), while others
use this evidence to value long-term increases in life span (Cutler and Richardson, 1997; Nordhaus,
2003; Becker, Philipson and Soares, 2005; Murphy and Topel, 2006). Most of these eﬀorts model
survivorship probabilities realistically, i.e., with implicit variance around mean life span. Panel B
in Figure 1 displays the survivorship probabilities, or the cumulative of the density in panel A.
But Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005), who examine a broad cross section of 96 rich and poor
countries in 1960, 1990, and 2000, could not examine complete survivorship curves because the
data were not available. Rather, they were forced to use only life expectancy at birth, the average
of the distribution.
7To be sure, higher moments do not matter if there is risk neutrality over length of life, and the
degree of risk aversion is not trivially clear and could be zero. This topic is particularly salient
for the medical profession, where decisions regarding life and death and the costs, beneﬁts, and
riskiness of procedures must be weighed by physicians and patients alike. Assessing net beneﬁts
requires assumptions about preferences over health states in diﬀerent future periods, and the med-
ical literature recognizes that the degree of risk aversion over remaining years of life will aﬀect this
calculation (Ried, 1998; Bleichrodt and Quiggin, 1999).
Measuring the concavity of preferences over life span is neither a common nor straightforward
activity, but the consensus view based on empirical research in the last decade seems to be that
individuals are risk averse. Bleichrodt and Johannesson (1997) report that four out of ﬁve empirical
studies directly examining this question reject risk neutrality over life years in favor of risk aversion
(McNeil, Weichselbaum and Pauker, 1978; Stiggelbout et al., 1994; Verhoef, Haan and van Daal,
1994; Maas and Wakker, 1994). These investigations typically ask respondents, sampled either
from medical treatment programs or from the community, to assess the desirability of various
probabilistic scenarios regarding survival in perfect health versus death. For many but not all
respondents, certainty equivalents are concave in life years, implying risk aversion.9 In a theoretical
contribution, Bommier (2006) models preferences over life span with an extra parameter producing
risk aversion even when the rate of time preference is zero.
But even if individuals are inherently risk averse over life span, they may be able to diversify
life-span risk through contingent claims. Indeed, observed heterogeneity in stated preferences may
reﬂect diﬀerential access to or use of markets for contingent claims. Annuities and life insurance are
two examples of market instruments that diversify risks associated with uncertain life spans, while
bequests are a nonmarket instrument that could also conceivably hedge against life-span uncer-
tainty. In this paper, I show that while full annuitization removes all consumption risk associated
with uncertain life span, and therefore improves welfare, annuities cannot remove the utility risk.
Even under full annuitization, life-span uncertainty is costly. Whether life insurance helps oﬀset
S10 is more diﬃcult to say, since it aﬀects individual utility only through the bequest motive. That
9The shape of preferences tends to vary by subgroup characteristics and based on whether the gamble is short or
long-term in nature. Pliskin, Shepard and Weinstein (1980) reveal apparent risk neutrality and even risk preference
among 10 Harvard researchers. Verhoef, Haan and van Daal (1994) ﬁnd their subjects are risk-seeking over small
gambles in life span but risk averse over large gambles, consistent with prospect theory. Miyamoto and Eraker (1985)
settle on risk neutrality over life years as an average over wide-ranging preferences they observe.
8is, actuarially fair life insurance is like a precommitted bequest, and to assess its beneﬁts we must
understand bequests.
If individuals are altruistic, it is conceivable that bequests could hedge life-span risk relatively
well if the bequest motive is strong. With utility deriving solely from consumption rather than from
other aspects of living, then the disutility of early death could in theory be balanced by increased
utility among survivors under altruistic bequests. Similarly, the additional utility deriving from
late death could be oﬀset by the impact of diminished bequests. But it is diﬃcult to see why such
fully altruistic individuals with utility only from consumption would care about any moment of life
span, including the average. Probably for this reason, the value-of-life literature typically ignores
bequest motives altogether (Chang, 1991; Johansson, 2002).
In any event, the literature on bequests is mixed with regard to the strength of the motive, with
some research indicating they are generally not intended (Hurd, 1987, 1989) and other research
suggesting otherwise (Kopczuk and Lupton, 2007). A prevailing view in economics is that bequests
are simply unused precautionary savings (Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes, 2004). Findings in the
medical literature of risk aversion over length of life certainly suggest that bequest motives are
either not universal or not strong enough to hedge against the risk of death. Another perspective
on bequests is that they can be strategic, a quid pro quo promised in exchange for elderly care
(Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985). Leaving aside the problem that living too long risks
depleting bequeathable wealth as well as requiring informal care, we might interpret strategic
bequests as merely another form of annuitization, if they are set aside up front.
In the next section, I reveal the theoretical cost of uncertain life span in the standard intertem-
poral model common to economics, paying special attention to the role of annuitization. I ﬁnd
that individuals who discount their future well-being in the standard way should be risk averse
over life span, even when they can fully annuitize. Consistent with the value-of-life literature, I do
not model a bequest motive explicitly, but I express the cost of variance in life span in terms of
the value of the mean. This lessens the sensitivity of my results to the assumption of no intended
bequests, because a bequest motive would work to reduce both simultaneously.
93 Modeling the cost of life-span uncertainty
Grossman (1972), Ehrlich and Chuma (1990), and others have modeled preferences over health
capital and life extension by adapting standard economic frameworks of intertemporal choice. Here
I continue that tradition but with a simpler model without health capital in order to enhance ana-
lytical tractability. It turns out that when future periods are discounted and additively separable,
expected utility maximization implies there is a large welfare cost associated with adult life-span
uncertainty for reasonable parameter values. There is also a very high cost attached to infant
mortality.
3.1 Setup of the model
Consider an expected utility maximizer at time t = 0 with an implicit rate of time discounting
equal to δ and no bequest motive.10 Lifetime expected utility is the sum of period utilities drawn
from consumption, u(c(t)), weighted by the force of time discounting, e−δt, and the probability





The survivorship function, ℓ(t), shown in Panel B of Figure 1, is one minus the cumulative density
function of life span. The decrement to ℓ(t) is the probability density function of life span, shown
in Panel A and commonly called life-table deaths. Finally, we deﬁne the life-table probability of
dying between t and t + 1 as q(t) = log[ℓ(t)] − log[ℓ(t + 1)].11 Panel C of Figure 1 shows how
mortality tends to increase exponentially with age, as originally revealed by Gompertz (1825). For
simplicity, I do not explicitly model health status. To the extent that younger, healthier life-years
are probably more valuable than older, sicker life-year years, my model will tend to underestimate
the true cost of a mean-preserving spread in life span.
10In reality, where mortality prospects vary across types, we might posit that an individual begins life under a
“veil of ignorance,” facing the full level of population uncertainty, but then learns his or her type later, which lowers
uncertainty. This would alter behavior once the type became known. I do not model this dynamic here for two
reasons. Parents, who possess better forecasts, make most of the decisions for children. Edwards and Tuljapurkar
(2005) show that although there are interesting diﬀerences in life-span uncertainty across U.S. subgroups, they are
not enormous.
11This form is more convenient for expositional purposes here, but life-table q(t) is typically deﬁned implicitly as
ℓ(t + 1) = ℓ(t)[1 − q(t)], in order to attrit the entire cohort at a ﬁnite age. In continuous time, q(t) is the hazard or
mortality rate.
10Suppose the individual has a ﬁnancial endowment W that can be consumed or saved at a ﬁxed
market rate of interest, r. For simplicity, there is no labor, education, capital, or ﬁnancial risk
in this model.12 In a market without annuities, the budget constraint requires the individual to





Under this budget constraint, the model will produce unintended bequests whose size varies in-
versely with length of life. This is because the individual must engage in a type of precautionary
saving against the risk of living too long, and unused savings become bequests. If instead actuarially





An annuity pays oﬀ in future periods only if the individual is alive. This allows the buyer to
ﬁnance future consumption more cheaply than through saving, but at the expense of unintended
bequests.13
The individual maximizes equation (1) subject either to (2) or (3) depending on whether an-
nuities are available. I can write the resulting Euler condition that describes intertemporal choice
as
u′(c(t + 1)) = u′(c(t))eδ−r+D q(t), (4)
where D is an indicator of the lack of annuities. Under full annuitization, D = 0 and mortality
cancels out of equation (4) because survivorship appears in both the objective and the constraint.
12Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil (2000) and Li and Tuljapurkar (2004) develop models that include retirement,
endogenous capital accumulation, and education alongside mortality. Each element probably increases the cost of
life-span variance. If individuals must trade their leisure time for market earnings, higher S10 erodes expected lifetime
wealth provided that the retirement age is within the support of probabilistic life span. If capital and the interest
rate were endogenous, higher S10 would likely deplete the capital stock by lowering the marginal utility of wealth,
raising the interest rate and lowering the wage rate. Eﬀects on welfare are countervailing, but it seems likely that the
net eﬀect would be negative. Human capital investment is riskier when S10 is higher, which should result in lower
educational attainment and a decrease in welfare. But it is also true that S10 is lower for groups with more education
(Edwards and Tuljapurkar, 2005). We might interpret this as very tangible evidence that S10 is costly.
13In this model with costlessly enforced contracts, the price of the annuity is the right to leave bequests. All wealth
that is unused by those who die is redistributed to the living.
11Other things equal, consumption will tend to be ﬂat through age if δ = r. But without annu-
ities, D = 1, and the mortality rate, q(t), which typically increases exponentially through age,
will pull marginal utility higher and consumption lower over age through a type of precautionary
saving (Hubbard and Judd, 1987). This will produce a consumption trajectory that looks like the
survivorship curve.
We are interested in the expected utility cost of variance in life span, or equivalently of facing
a mortality schedule q(t) that is rising exponentially rather than staying at zero until rising to 1
at the date of death. Based on equation (4), it is tempting to assert that annuities must oﬀset the
cost of life-span variance, since q(t) does not appear in the Euler equation under full annuitization.
In fact, annuitization reduces the cost of variance but cannot eliminate it, as I will now show.
My analytical strategy is to assume full annuitization, normally distributed life spans, and power
utility in order to ﬁnd a convenient closed-form solution for the cost of life-span variance. Later, I
use numerical simulations to relax assumptions about annuities and the distribution of life spans.
Since period utility is a function of consumption, which typically depends on time or age and thus
the distribution of life span, it is convenient to assume a speciﬁc functional form of utility in order
to proceed. Power utility is a standard assumption in economics and a reasonable baseline. Since
my qualitative results are driven by discounting and time-separability, they are likely to generalize
to other period utility functions. More fundamental questions, such as whether preferences actually
reﬂect time-separability and exponential discounting, and whether they are age independent, are
perfectly valid but beyond the scope of this paper to address.
123.2 Full annuitization and normally distributed life spans
Let u(·) take the familiar form of power utility with constant relative risk aversion over consumption





Under full annuitization, survivorship weights appear both in lifetime utility and in the budget
constraint. Thus mortality cancels out of the Euler equation (4), which simpliﬁes to
c(t) = c(0)et[r−δ]/γ, (6)
where c(0) is a function of wealth, the parameters, the annuitization indicator, D, and the moments
of life span. I will proceed by assuming that c(0) remains constant over small changes in the
moments of life span, an assumption that I later relax in numerical simulations.15
With the simpliﬁed Euler equation, we could completely solve the model by reformulating the







where T is a random variable, the realization of life span, and E is the expectations operator. The
survivorship weights are now implicit in the expectation. For a given distribution of T, we could
14To be sure, the use of power (isoelastic) utility raises some issues in any setting when periods of life are variable.
Here, the level of utility matters, which is usually not the case. It must be positive or else life is not a good. We
can model this with certain combinations of the utility shifter K and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, γ, as do
Ehrlich (2000), Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005), and Hall and Jones (2007), but questions may remain as to the
appropriateness of this technique. No study has attempted to test the restrictions imposed on the characteristics of u(·)
in this case, namely the implied degree of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution in consumption, and analogous
preferences over years of life. We already know power utility does not jointly satisfy the ﬁrst two particularly well
(Epstein and Zin, 1989, 1991), but that has not precluded its widespread use. To what extent modeling preferences
over length of life complicate this picture is a question awaiting future research. I believe my core results hinge on
the assumptions of time separability and exponential time discounting, and not on the curvature of the period utility
function, or on the restriction that the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion in consumption equals the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption.
15Mean life span, M, aﬀects c(0) in obvious ways, and Rosen (1988) shows how extending life incurs a marginal
cost associated with reducing consumption in all periods, holding other things, namely liftime wealth, equal. A more
subtle point is that the variance in life span, S
2, also aﬀects c(0) for the same reason that variance aﬀects lifetime
expected utility. But the direction of the eﬀect is counterintuitive. Through Jensen’s Inequality, (expected) lifetime
discounted consumption is lower when variance in life span is higher. At any given initial wealth, c(0) can then be
higher than under less variance while still satisying the budget constraint. Numerical simulations reveal that the
eﬀects on c(0) of changing M or S
2 are small.
13use equation (6) to solve the integral and then ﬁnd c(0) by taking the expectation.16 But we are
primarily interested in the relative price of variance in life-span in this model, which is governed








where as before, T is a random variable. With the power utility formulation in equation (5) and
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where K is the constant utility of being alive, and
ˆ δ = δ −
1 − γ
γ
(r − δ). (10)
When r is close to δ, we have ˆ δ ≈ δ; and ˆ δ = δ when either r = δ or γ → 1.
3.2.1 Risk aversion over life span
Examination of equation (9) reveals that individuals are risk averse over life span in this model if
the rate of time discounting, δ, is positive and not too diﬀerent from the real interest rate, r. The
Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion over T, −EUTT/EUT, is approximately equal to
the rate of time discounting, δ, and exactly equal when r = δ. That is, absolute risk aversion in
life span is roughly constant.17
We would expect individuals who are risk averse over life span to be hurt by uncertainty in life
span, and this is exactly what we see if T ∼ N(M,S2).18 When life spans are normally distributed,
16Without annuities, the presence of q(t) in the consumption function precludes analytical solutions because mor-
tality increases exponentially with age.
17As discussed earlier, constant absolute risk aversion over life span seems consistent with roughly linear time trends
in life expectancy and a stable S10 during the era since World War II. This is because constant relative risk aversion
over consumption risk, such as implied by power utility, ﬁts the pattern of exponential growth in consumption and
stability in the standard deviations of log consumption and of asset returns, and in ﬁnancial risk premia (Campbell
and Viceira, 2002).
18As shown by Figure 1, adult life spans are technically not normal, with both leftward skewness and leptokurtosis,
or peakedness with fat tails, an indicator of diﬀerent subgroup variances. Below, I show that numerical simulations
14expected lifetime utility in this model is
EU =
c(0)1−γ
(1 − γ)ˆ δ
h









by virtue of the properties of lognormality. That is, expected lifetime utility is a decreasing function
of S, provided that δ > 0, r and δ are not too dissimilar, and period utility is positive.19
3.2.2 Pricing the variance in life span
It is convenient to recover the price pS of a standard deviation in life span, S, in terms of the mean,





When the utility shifter K is nonzero, this ratio is mathematically complicated.20 A ﬁrst-order
Taylor expansion around K = 0 reveals





ˆ δ − δ
￿
e(ˆ δ−δ)M+(δ2−ˆ δ2)S2/2SK. (13)
When K = 0 or when ˆ δ = δ, this reduces exactly to a parsimonious relationship:
pS = −ˆ δS. (14)
The price of a standard deviation in life span, pS, is negative when ˆ δ > 0 because S is a bad. That
is, an individual who faces higher variance in life span must be compensated by a longer mean life
span. In addition, pS increases linearly with the level of S, with the magnitude of the slope equal to
show that normality reduces the cost of S as long as the discount rate is positive, so this assumption produces an
underestimate of the true cost.
19It is a standard observation that period utility, which is the marginal utility of being alive in that period, should
be nonnegative when modeling dynamics of life span (Rosen, 1988; Hall and Jones, 2004; Becker, Philipson and
Soares, 2005). If it were negative or zero, a utility maximizing individual would choose to die. Becker, Philipson and
Soares (2005) calibrate the additive utility shifter K < 0. This reduces the cost of S through the second piece of
(11), but numerical simulations conﬁrm this eﬀect to be small and uninteresting.
20The constant utility shifter does not appreciably augment the insights to be gained. Were K to describe period
utility alone, it would imply the same dynamics as when r = δ, with only δ mattering for cost. When K is combined
with ﬂow utility from consumption, both numerator and denominator in (12) are weighted averages of the two pieces
in equation (11). When the piece including K has more weight, the coeﬃcient on S in pS shifts closer to δ than ˆ δ.
15ˆ δ, approximately the rate of time discounting. That is, the costliness of a standard deviation in life
span in terms of the mean rises with the level of uncertainty. Mathematically speaking, this follows
directly from the lognormality of lifetime utility. Intuitively, the willingness to bear additional risk
falls with the level of risk because its marginal disutility rises. We see the same type of behavior
in ﬁnancial markets, where returns on ﬁnancial assets are also approximately lognormal, and risk
premia tend to rise strongly with the riskiness of returns.21
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= −ˆ δS. (15)
The end result is the same as in the Taylor expansion, but this formulation reveals a subtle point
that will become important in Section 4. The marginal utility of mean life years, the denominator,
is decreasing in the mean but increasing in the variance, so that improvements in life expectancy of
a given size are more valuable when variance is high. This somewhat counterintuitive result again
derives from discounting. Gaining an additional year at the mean under full certainty is not worth
as much as gaining an additional year in expectation when there are higher survivorship weights
on earlier, less heavily discounted years, and lower weights on later years.
We could also solve for the dollar price of S by constructing the ratio of marginal lifetime
utilities of S and c(0) or wealth instead, but pricing the variance in terms of mean life span is
useful for two reasons. If bequests are intended, they should attenuate both the marginal disutility
of life-span variance and the marginal utility of mean life span, while probably amplifying the
marginal utility of consumption, since your money could buy happiness through your children’s
happiness. Although evidence suggests that bequest motives must not be very strong, the price
of S in terms of M is likely to be a more stable relationship than the price of either in terms of
money. The latter depends on assumptions about the curvature of utility in terms of consumption,
given by γ here, and thus the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, and if they
are not separated, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion in consumption. As I will discuss later,
21According to data presented by Ibbotson Associates (2002), the standard deviation of the excess return on
equities was 14 percent between 1948 and 1999, which demanded a risk premium of about 9 percent. Excess returns
on corporate bonds had a standard deviation a little over half as large, 8.5 percent, but the risk premium on corporate
bonds was much lower, only 1.3 percent, or about one seventh of the equity risk premium.
16conceptualizing the price of variance in terms of the mean rather than consumption is also useful
for interpreting current cross-national and intertemporal diﬀerences in population health.
Is pS = −ˆ δS high or low? It clearly depends on the level of the discount rate. If we choose
r = δ = 0.03, their standard values in calibration exercises (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1994;
Becker, Philipson and Soares, 2005), then at the current U.S. level of S = 15, we ﬁnd that pS =
−0.45 year. That is, the average citizen would be willing to give up almost half a year in mean
life span in order to obtain a standard deviation in life span that was one year lower. For now, I
simply remark that this cost seems large, and later I provide some context for assessing the cost
relative to levels of population health across time and space.
3.3 Numerical solutions of the full model
I next examine the sensitivity of the analytical result, pS = −ˆ δS, to alternative assumptions about
wealth annuitization and mortality using numerical methods. I set parameters to match those
used by Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005): r = δ = 0.03, γ = 0.8, and K = −16.2. Initial
wealth equaling $800,000 is consistent with the parameter values, U.S. life spans, and per capita
consumption of $26,650 per year. I also fully endogenize consumption. For better tractability and
for clearer comparisons, I begin by modeling life span as normally distributed.22 For now I omit
infant and child mortality and set S equal to the standard deviation in life spans above age 10,
S10. Similarly, for M I use M10, which is also equal to remaining life expectancy at age 10, e10,
plus 10. I set mean and variance equal to U.S. levels in 1994, M10 = 76.85 and S10 = 15.66 years,
and I search for the mean life span that compensates expected utility for a decrease in S10 to 15.05,
the 1999 level. It is convenient to use data from these two years because there is a relatively large
diﬀerence in S10 but a small diﬀerence in M10, which reduces the complexity of later simulations
with fully realistic mortality.
22I truncate these synthetic distributions at ages 0 and 150 and rescale so that their cdf’s sum to unity. Age 150
is an unrealistic but convenient choice when life spans are normally distributed. The Human Mortality Database
(2009) topcodes age at 110, and there are few documented individuals who have survived to that age. When life
spans are normally distributed with means around age 80, densities past age 110 are not miniscule. Truncating at
age 110 actually creates signiﬁcant skewness in the distribution, and probably changes the mean and variance. Such
skewed distributions actually produce a pS locus that better resembles that under realistic survivorship because real
life spans are skew-left.
173.3.1 Normally distributed life spans
Figure 3 plots pS as given by equation (14), shown by the thick solid line, on the same axes with
two other loci that I obtain from numerical simulation of the model with normally distributed life
spans. I ﬁx the rate of market interest at r = 0.03 and examine how varying δ, shown along the
horizontal axis, changes pS given S10 = 15.66. The steeper, concave line shows the locus obtained
from the numerical model with full annuitization of wealth, while the lower dashed line depicts the
schedule that results from the numerical model without annuitization.
The two solid lines reveal relatively limited diﬀerences between the analytical and numerical
versions of the model with annuities. They cross at δ = 0.03, with the numerical model producing
a more steeply sloped pS locus that becomes concave at high δ. These diﬀerences are due to the
presence of the utility shifter K, which when negative tends to increase pS when δ is large, as shown
by equation (13). When K > 0, the numerical locus is ﬂatter than the analytical locus, and when
K = 0, the lines overlap. Both lines show that when 0 < γ < 1 and δ is small relative to r = 0.03, ˆ δ
can actually become negative, which shifts pS positive. When time discounting is very low relative
to the rate of interest and intertemporal substitutability is high, it is optimal to consume more in
the future. A mean-preserving spread in life span, which trades away earlier years for later years,
could actually improve expected well-being for somebody with heavily back-loaded consumption.
The relationship in Figure 3 between the cost of uncertainty under annuitization and the cost
without annuitization is more interesting. The dashed line, which shows pS without annuities, is
signiﬁcantly lower than the other two, indicating that life-span variance is more costly at any δ
without annuities. At the baseline of r = δ = 0.03, pS without annuitization is about −0.75, more
than half again as large as pS with annuitization, which is about −0.45. This is an intuitive result
insofar as annuitization is designed to remove risks to consumption associated with uncertain life
span. That annuitization removes only a little over one third of the total cost of life-span uncertainty
under baseline parameter values is more surprising. In this model, the direct utility cost of S is
more important than the cost of consumption uncertainty.
One can also vary r while holding δ = 0.03 ﬁxed, which is shown in Figure 4. Here, an even
greater diﬀerence emerges between the numerical and analytical models under annuitization, which
again turns out to be linked to the utility shifter K. The numerical model reveals considerably
18more negative pS when r < δ and K < 0. This is because when r < δ, consumption optimally
declines over time. If in addition K < 0, the beneﬁt of living long is weakened considerably relative
to the cost of dying early, so the cost of S is higher. As before, we see that pS is more negative
when annuities are not available, regardless of the level of r. Each locus also shows that the cost
of S is declining in magnitude with r. If 0 < γ < 1, then a very large r, around 0.15 with these
parameters, can produce a negative ˆ δ and thus a positive pS (not shown). As before, when r is
high relative to δ, the price of future consumption is low. Intertemporal substitutability is high
when 0 < γ < 1, and the individual will substitute toward future consumption. If r is high enough,
a mean-preserving spread in life span might actually improve expected well-being for someone so
dependent on future utility.
The period utility curvature parameter, γ, does play a role here but is much less interesting
than one might expect.23 We are accustomed to thinking of γ as the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion over gambles in consumption, since a higher γ represents a more concave period utility
function. Here, its inﬂuence is more easily understood as deriving from its other role, the inverse
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.24 When 0 < γ < 1, the consumer likes to substitute
consumption between periods because marginal utility in any period remains high, and any diﬀer-
ence between r and δ will be ampliﬁed and will generally aﬀect pS. But when γ > 1, there are
weaker gains from intertemporal redistribution, and high or low interest rates do not greatly aﬀect
ˆ δ ≈ δ.
23As I discussed in note 14, the tradition in the literature on valuing life extension is not to separate the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion (CRRA) from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), although researchers in asset
pricing often model preferences that way (Epstein and Zin, 1989, 1991). When longevity is endogenous and must be
purchased, as in the growth model of Hall and Jones (2007), this could be problematic because the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and length of life ought to depend on the EIS, not the CRRA. In the present
context, the conﬂation of the EIS and CRRA is not important. Functionally, the MRS between average length of life
and the variance depends mostly on the time discount rate. Intuitively, it is only utility curvature over length of life,
not consumption, that matters in the cost of life-span variance. The relevant issue here is whether additively time-
separable preferences are overly conﬁning, and I defer to established tradition in this subﬁeld while acknowledging it
remains an open and interesting question.
24An interesting parallel emerges but is left for future research. We have seen how δ, the rate of time discounting,
is also the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion over life span in this model. It is an open question whether attitudes
toward time and risk as regards periods of life ought to be or even can be separated, as they have been with attitudes
regarding consumption (Epstein and Zin, 1989, 1991).
193.3.2 Realistic adult life spans without infant mortality
Modern distributions of human life span are skew-left and leptokurtic, not normal. The skewness
is of direct interest here, because it implies that a mean-preserving spread in life span lowers
survivorship probabilities asymmetrically. When there is leftward skewness, an increase in variance
reduces survivorship at young adult as well as adult ages, or across two age groups, while increasing
it only at old ages. Because of discounting, skewness should amplify the cost of uncertain life spans.
It is tricky to model realistic life spans with particular means and variances because we do not
have a convenient functional form of the actual probability distribution of life spans. I proceed by
generating additive translations of the 1999 life-span distribution above age 10 in the U.S., which
originally had a mean of 77.67 and a standard deviation of 15.05, so that I have an array of realistic
distributions with varying means but ﬁxed variances. Then I search for the distribution that
produces the same lifetime expected utility as the 1994 distribution above age 10 with M10 = 76.85
and S10 = 15.66.25
Figure 5 is an analogue of Figure 3 with realistic adult mortality. It depicts the same three loci
of pS against δ for r = 0.03 and uses the same vertical scale for easier comparison. The thick solid
line, which shows the analytical model’s pS, is the same as before, since I cannot mathematically
model realistic life spans. The other two schedules reveal levels of pS that are more negative than
in Figure 3, especially for larger δ. That is, the cost of life-span uncertainty is indeed higher when
I model life span realistically, with leftward skewness that places a wider range of early years at
risk. The thin solid line, representing the output of the numerical model with annuities, shows
pS ≈ −0.7 when δ = 0.03, which is considerably greater in magnitude than the pS = −0.45 from
the simple model. As δ rises, both numerical models show more precipitous increases in the cost
of variance when adult life span is realistic.
25I apply a cubic spline to the distribution of life spans by single years of age over age 10 in the U.S. in 1999,
and I sequentially evaluate the spline at hundredths of a year in age, spaced one year apart. I then redeﬁne age
back to whole years, which produces a sideways translation of the distribution, changing the mean but preserving
the variance. At ages under 10, I simply duplicate the density at 10 and renormalize the entire distribution. Later I
include realistic infant mortality as explained in the text.
203.3.3 Fully realistic life spans with infant mortality
Some human life spans end at birth or shortly thereafter, and the variance attributable to infant
and child mortality is by far the most costly. One less infant death is one more average adult life
span, other things equal, so the value of a marginal reduction in deaths at age 0 should be equal
to the reduction times the expected utility of an entire average life span. As we have seen, the
marginal cost of adult variance is much lower, worth a fraction of an additional year of life rather
than an entire life span. Infant mortality is relatively uncommon in advanced countries today,
so ignoring it when focusing on the diﬀerences between Sweden and the U.S. in 1999 is perfectly
acceptable, as I will demonstrate. But as will become clear in Section 4, infant mortality plays a
very important role in understanding the value of mortality declines in rich countries over longer
periods of time and in poor countries, where infant mortality remains high.
Here, I am concerned with how the presence of infant mortality may aﬀect pS. Given a ﬁxed
pattern of adult survivorship, higher infant mortality reduces the average length of life and raises
total variability. By making mean life scarcer and raising the marginal utility of M, the presence
of any infant mortality should lower pS. But because the marginal disutility of adult variance rises
with adult variance, infant mortality could conceivably amplify the marginal disutility of S if the
latter were also sensitive to total life-span variance. This would tend to increase pS. To ascertain
which of these countervailing eﬀects wins out, I numerically simulate the cost of adult variance
under fully realistic survivorship with infant mortality. I treat infant mortality as a completely
separate dynamic, ﬁxing infant deaths at their relative probability in 1999 and reestimate the
compensating change in mean adult life span that oﬀsets the reduction in S from 15.66 to 15.05.26
Figure 6 depicts pS as functions of δ when r = 0.03. Survivorship is now fully realistic, with
a ﬁxed amount of infant mortality in addition to leftward skewness and leptokurtosis in the adult
hump. Including infant mortality does not change the qualitative results, but it does attenuate
pS compared to Figure 5, where adult mortality is realistic but there is no infant mortality. The
presence of infant mortality apparently increases the marginal utility of mean life more than it
raises the marginal disutility of a standard deviation in life span, if it changes the latter at all. The
magnitude of pS may be less with fully realistic mortality than without infant mortality, but the
26I overlay the life span distribution under age 10 in 1999 on top of the distribution in 1994 and on top of each
translated distribution from 1999 that has a diﬀerent mean. Then I renormalize so that each cdf sums to unity.
21analytical solution remains a conservative estimate of the true cost.27
3.4 The cost of infant mortality
A separate but related question that arises with cross-country comparisons is the cost of infant
mortality. The previous section shows it does not greatly aﬀect pS, and diﬀerences in infant
mortality between advanced countries today are minor. But infant mortality is much higher and
more volatile across longer periods of time or wider geographic space, so it could easily prove
important for assessing well-being more broadly.
Unlike a central moment like S10, infant mortality strongly aﬀects the mean length of life,
especially when infant mortality is high. It is partly for this reason why model life tables and
estimates of period life expectancy at birth in developing countries are primarily based on measures
of infant mortality and often little else. Given this, one might expect diﬀerences in period life
expectancy to suﬃciently encompass diﬀerences in infant mortality so that valuation studies need
only consider the former. But the question is how each aﬀects lifetime utility, and in fact they
can operate very diﬀerently. Here, I treat infant utility as if it were simply shortened adult utility.
This is consistent with its treatment in the literature on the value of life extension, but it may
not be a valid assumption in a more realistic setting such as with parental altruism, evolving time
preference, and so on.
Assume for simplicity that infant mortality is completely described by q(0), the probability of
death between ages zero and one, and suppose q(0) rises by some amount i ∈ (0,1). Under these
circumstances, a decline in infant mortality of i = −0.01 raises survivorship, life expectancy at
birth e0, and lifetime expected utility each by 1 percent.28 By comparison, proportional increases
in e0 brought about solely by reductions in adult mortality typically produce less than proportional
27To assess how very high rates of infant mortality might change the marginal utility of mean life span and this
pS, I ran the same experiment using Swedish data from 1900, when deaths at age 0 were 10 percent. Results were
very similar, with the analytical result still a conservative estimate so long as δ > 0.02 when r = 0.03. If δ < 0.01,
pS became positive with such high infant mortality.
28When schedule q
∗(t) diﬀers from q(t) only by q



























Life expectancy at birth is the integral of survivorship, e0 =
R ∞
0 ℓ(t) dt, while lifetime expected utility is given by
equation (1). With complete annuities and r = δ, lifetime utility rises proportionally with i along with e0 and ℓ(t).
22increases in lifetime utility.29 This is because discounting reduces the value of gains that are
centered around the average length of life relative to the value of gains derived from infant mortality,
which are broadly distributed across all ages. The implication is that declines in infant mortality
are considerably more valuable than implied by their eﬀect on life expectancy at birth alone.
This insight will prove useful in Section 4, when I reassess global convergence in mortality after
accounting for adult variance and infant mortality in addition to mean length of life.
For another perspective on the cost of infant mortality, I can examine pi, the cost of infant mor-
tality in terms of the mean, the analogue of pS. Assuming complete annuities, normally distributed





(1 − e−ˆ δM+ˆ δ2S2/2)/ˆ δ
e−ˆ δM+ˆ δ2S2/2 = −
e
ˆ δM−ˆ δ2S2/2 − 1
ˆ δ
(16)
where I have canceled out period utility. As with pS, the price of a bad is negative. Because the
shock i multiplies survivorship and is eﬀectively the change in the probability of living at all, the
marginal lifetime utility of a unit change in i is very large: all of lifetime expected utility. This
will always exceed the marginal utility of a mean life year, which is the discounted value of a single
year lived at the mean length of life. Equation (16) states that a unit reduction in i is preferable to
a unit increase in M, which is when pi < −1, if the compounded risk-adjusted return to investing
at the discount rate for M years, the numerator, is higher than the discount rate, the one-period
return. Whenever M is suﬃciently greater than 1, of course it is more valuable to live at all than
to increase the mean length of life.
A more interesting measure is pi/100, the price of one percentage point in the infant survival
probability in terms of the mean length of life. Recasting ˆ δ in terms of percentage points in equation
(16) reveals that when δ = 0.03, pi is about one third of the risk-adjusted return to living M years.
This reaches and begins to exceed 1 in absolute value around M = 40 when there is realistic adult
variance. That is, when life expectancy exceeds 40, a decline in infant mortality of a percentage
point is more valuable than an additional year in the mean. Life expectancy at birth exceeds 40
in the majority of countries during the modern period, but notable exceptions include countries
29For example, if life expectancy T = M with complete certainty, r = δ, and consumption is fully annuitized,
EU = u(¯ c)(1−e
−δM)/δ. When δ = 0.03, an increase in M of one percent will raise EU by half a percent when M is
around 40, by one-third of a percent when M is near 60, and by one-quarter of a percent when M is 80. Numerical
simulation reveals that this relationship also holds when there is realistic but static variance in length of life.
23hard-hit by HIV/AIDS.
4 Discussion and Extensions
4.1 The role of the discount rate
The key element in the model is the discount rate, δ, which is approximately the coeﬃcient of
absolute risk aversion over gambles in life span. The main issue is measuring it, since it is a latent
preference parameter. It is standard in the literature to set it equal to 3 percent, roughly the real
rate of return on government bonds, and here I have followed suit. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) review
estimates of the discount rate in the U.S. and report a very wide range of 1–17 percent, making it
diﬃcult to reject the hypothesis that market rates of interest and the discount rate are the same
(Picone, Sloan and Taylor Jr., 2004). The baseline of δ = 0.03 therefore certainly seems reasonable
by ﬁnancial market standards. Via an evolutionary argument, Rogers (1994) suggests that the
discount rate in human populations should equal roughly 2 percent in the long run, which is in the
same ballpark.
But discount rates appear to vary over individuals within and across countries (Barsky et al.,
1997; Becker and Mulligan, 1997), as do life spans. We must be careful about assessing the costs
of diﬀerent life-span variance under diﬀerent discount rates if time preferences and life spans are
related to one another. Fuchs (1982) views the discount rate as determinining health investments,
while Becker and Mulligan (1997) see wealth, uncertainty, and health or the length of life as jointly
determining the discount rate.
If the causality runs from life span to the discount rate, then a reasonable way to deal with
the endogeneity is by treating the discount rate as a universal, unvarying parameter set at some
reasonable baseline and used to price variance, which may diﬀer. If causality runs the other way,
the story becomes more complicated. My model shows that a higher discount rate increases the
costliness of life-span variance, which should incentivize behavior leading to lower variance. While
the net eﬀect on pS is ambiguous, the true cost of variance will be higher than measured with
a standard discount rate. But it is also plausible that higher discount rates could produce more
life-span variance. This could occur if myopic, risky behavior carries long-term costs but yields
some short-term beneﬁts, which I do not measure. If this were the case, we might ﬁnd that the
24costs of additional life-span uncertainty were outweighed by the beneﬁts, clearly a problematic
but also a seemlingly far-fetched scenario. Public health campaigns certainly suggest that most
risky behaviors are socially undesirable, if they ultimately say little about net private returns. A
normative assessment remains elusive here, a point I concede but relegate to future eﬀorts.
4.2 Uncertainty in actual life spans
Diﬀerent groups and individuals face substantially diﬀerent amount of life-span uncertainty, not all
of which can be due to behavioral diﬀerences. Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005) show that S10 is
systematically lower by about 1 year among females compared with males, and that it is 2–3 years
higher among African Americans relative to whites. Individuals in the lowest quintile of household
income had 2.4 more years in standard deviation than those in the upper 80 percent, while those
without a high school degree had 2.1 years more than high school graduates. A subgroup diﬀerence
of 3 years in standard deviation implies a diﬀerence in pS of almost 0.1 year if δ = 0.03, an increase
in the costliness of life-span uncertainty of 20 percent.30
With this much subgroup variation, one must be cautious about interpreting trends in aggre-
gate uncertainty. An increase in aggregate S10 could reﬂect increasing between-group inequality,
increasing within-group inequality, or both. An increase in life expectancy among a high-mean,
low-variance group would technically increase aggregate S10 but also be Pareto-improving, pro-
vided individuals knew their group. Although aggregate S10 in the U.S. has displayed little trend
(Edwards and Tuljapurkar, 2005), recent evidence on widening educational diﬀerentials in life ex-
pectancy (Meara, Richards and Cutler, 2008) suggests between-group inequality is indeed increas-
ing. The implications are unclear, especially because within-group inequality should be decreasing
if aggregate S10 is indeed stable. These patterns pose interesting questions for future research.
What about members of diﬀerent birth cohorts? Up to now, I have proxied the actual, or
cohort life spans of individuals with those based on period mortality rates; period S10 thus measures
uncertainty for a ﬁctitious cohort of individuals living their entire lives in a single period. Although
period S10 is the appropriate variance analogue of period life expectancy, the most commonly cited
30The less fortunate also bear a heavier burden if they have disproportionately less access to annuities, which we
have found to oﬀset perhaps one third of the cost of life-span uncertainty. This characteristic may be observationally
linked to high δ, since one reason why low-SES individuals might appear to have high δ, myopia, or insuﬃcient saving,
is if they face liquidity constraints or incomplete markets. We would expect that access to annuities markets are also
poor for liquidity constrained individuals.
25population health statistic, we would also like to know the levels of variance faced by actual cohorts.
Diﬀerences between cohort and period S10 do not appear to be large, as shown by Figure 7. I
plot both measures for the U.S. since 1900 using annual period life tables from the Human Mortality
Database (2009) and cohort life tables collected and forecast by the Social Security Administration
(Bell and Miller, 2005). The two series track each other relatively well, with both showing the
enormous impact of the epidemiological transition early last century. Cohorts alive today, who face
S10 = 15, face drastically less uncertainty in their life spans than those born around 1900, for whom
S10 = 21.31
4.3 Population health over time and space
By providing a new method of converting units of variance in length of life into units of mean,
equation (14) facilitates a more complete assessment of population health in a variety of settings.
More generally, the chief insight of this paper, that variance in length of life is costly under time
discounting, leads us to reassess what we know about the value of mortality improvements over
time and across countries. In particular, we can reexamine either the diﬀerences between advanced
countries such as the U.S. and Sweden at a point in time, the diﬀerences between observations of
the same advanced country at diﬀerent points in time, or the diﬀerences between rich and poor
countries across time. Applied intertemporally, this new perspective also provides insights into
the nature and timing of demographic and epidemiological transitions that have occurred and are
proceeding today in various parts of the world.
4.3.1 Contemporary diﬀerences between advanced countries
In 1999, individuals in the U.S. experienced a standard deviation in life spans conditional on survival
to age 10 equal to about S10 = 15 years. At that level, each year of standard deviation is worth
about pS = −0.45 year of mean life span in this model, assuming r = δ = 0.03, the standard value
31Technically, true cohort S10 should also reﬂect uncertainty about future mortality rates, or in other words,
uncertainty about the shape of the probability distribution itself. We can treat forecast uncertainty as independent
from what we might call life-table uncertainty, by which we mean the uncertainty in life span in a known probability
distribution, because the time-series evidence seems to support that conclusion (Lee and Carter, 1992). Using the
Lee-Carter method of forecasting mortality, I found that forecast uncertainty appears to be small, perhaps 1 year in
standard deviation for the cohort born in 2000, relative to life-table uncertainty around 15.3 years. Since these are
independent risks, this cohort’s total S10 = 15.33, or only 0.03 year higher than that implied by the median forecast
life table.
26in calibration exercises using U.S. data. In Sweden that same year, S10 was about 13. According
to this model, individuals in the U.S. would be willing to give up almost 0.9 year in mean life span
to have the lower S10 of their Swedish counterparts.32 The mean life span conditional on survival
to age 10, M10, was 77.7 years in the U.S. and 80.0 in Sweden in 1999. If we account for diﬀerences
in S10, the total diﬀerence in population health between the U.S. and Sweden, as measured by
“eﬀective” life expectancy, is more like 3.2 life years per person rather than 2.3, an increase of more
than a third.
To be sure, the U.S. and Sweden represent two relative extremes where diﬀerences between
e0 and S10 are very large. A slightly diﬀerent perspective emerges when we examine a group of
advanced economies. Among the 27 members of the OECD that are also designated as high-income
countries by the World Bank, life expectancy at birth averaged 78.4 with a standard deviation of
about 2 years in 2000, while S10 averaged 13.5 with a standard deviation of 0.5 year. Translating
the diﬀerences in S10 from the average into penalties in life expectancy using pS = −0.45 widens the
standard deviation in eﬀective life expectancy from 2 to about 2.2 years, or by roughly 10 percent.
Measured inequality certainly increases when we account for diﬀerent variances, but the eﬀect is
moderate in size.
4.3.2 Temporal trends within a country
Because the underlying trends in mean and adult variance are so diﬀerent, as shown by Edwards and
Tuljapurkar (2005), the ﬁndings in this paper suggest it is worthwhile to decompose the economic
value of historical gains against mortality into portions attributable to reductions in variance versus
improvements in mean life span. Nordhaus (2003) and Murphy and Topel (2006) measure the total
value of mortality improvement the U.S. over historical periods using estimates of the willingness
to pay for mortality reductions. They ﬁnd that the value of health improvements is very large,
rivaling the value of GDP. But how much is due to increases in the mean, which show no signs
of stopping (White, 2002; Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002), and how much is due to declines in adult
variance, which have largely stalled since 1960?
32For large changes in the moments, S and thus pS will change. The isoquants of lifetime expected utility for two
normally distributed life spans L1 ∼ N(M1,S
2
1) and L2 ∼ N(M2,S
2





27Murphy and Topel highlight the wide dispersion of gains across ages prior to 1950, when reduc-
tions in life-span variance were sustained and thus much more important. This pattern is evident
in the top two rows of Table 1, which list life expectancy at birth (e0) and the standard deviation
in life spans above age 10 (S10) in 1900, 1950, and 2000. Survivorship to age 10 (ℓ10), which acts
as an importance weight for characteristics of the life table above age 10, is shown in the third
row. Changes over time in these three life-table parameters appear in the bottom panel. Between
1900 and 1950, life expectancy rose by 20.7 years from 47.7 to 68.4, an increase of over 40 percent.
Similarly, S10 fell by 8 years, from 24 to 16, a factor of one third. While life expectancy continued
to increase steadily after 1950, rising an additional 8.3 years by 2000, at a rate of 0.166 per annum,
further reductions in S10 were slight, totaling only 1.1 years over the second half of the century.
The bottom panel in Table 1 translates the observed declines in S10 into equivalent gains in
mean life years using the formula for pS derived earlier, assuming δ = 0.03 in all periods. The
relevant price of a discrete change in S10 is δ times the average S10 during the interval, and the
resulting value of the decline in S10 must be discounted by the average level of survivorship to age
10 in order to capture the beneﬁt to the average individual. This latter step is especially important
when ℓ10 is relatively low, as it was in the U.S. early last century. Combining the value of decreased
S10 with the change in e0 produces a measure of the total gains against mortality in terms of mean
life years. By this accounting, 14 percent of the total gains over the century were due to reductions
in life-span variance, but but after 1950, that ﬁgure falls to 5.6 percent.
4.3.3 Convergence in “full income” across countries
In a widely cited paper, Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005) reveal relatively more global con-
vergence in human well-being when it is measured by “full income,” a statistic they devise that
combines GDP per capita with the monetized value of life, than when it is measured by GDP per
capita alone. Owing to data constraints in their panel of 96 countries measured since 1960, they
can only account for changes in life expectancy at birth rather than changes in higher moments
or in entire survivorship schedules. Given the costliness of variance, has its omission biased their
results, and if so which way?
Complete life tables are not widely available for a broad cross section of countries because the
underlying mortality data are typically of poor quality. For many developing countries where data
28is scarce, surveillance agencies have estimated levels of life expectancy at birth (e0) using model
life tables, but historical databases do not include complete model life tables. Recently, Lopez
et al. (2001) and the World Bank have produced estimates of current life tables for virtually all
countries, but historical coverage has remained lacking. New work by Edwards (2009b) collects and
reconstructs historical estimates of life tables in developing countries and allows a reassessment of
convergence in the full income measure after accounting for changes in variance and the shape of
the survivorship function.33 As discussed by Edwards, these new data are of varying and often
dubious quality, but they are no worse than much of the original data on life expectancy commonly
found in databases and used by Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005) and many others.
The methodological component in Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005) that captures the eﬀects





With full annuitization and the time discount rate δ equal to the interest rate r, indirect utility
is the product of A(ℓ) and the period utility function. When only life expectancy e0 is known,
survivorship must implicitly be rectangular, or equal to 1 at all ages until falling to 0 at e0. Under
those conditions, equation (17) simpliﬁes to
A∗(ℓ) ≈
1 − e−r e0
r
. (18)
As seen and discussed earlier, for example in equation (11), the presence of variance in adult length
of life will reduce the value of the annuity:
A†(ℓ) ≈





where S10 is the standard deviation in adult length of life. If there is any adult variance, A(ℓ) and
A†(ℓ) are both less than A∗(ℓ), so equation (19) should be a closer approximation to (17) than (18).
33In their original work, Becker, Philipson and Soares (2003) examined a narrower cross section of 49 countries
in the WHO mortality database. With data on age-speciﬁc mortality rates, they constructed life tables and full
survivorship schedules. Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005) measured convergence among a broader sample of 96
countries for whom only life expectancy at birth is provided by the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
database.
29As discussed in Section 3, high infant mortality also tends to reduce A(ℓ), holding other things
including e0 equal. Indeed, infant mortality can be conceptualized as additional variance in human
life span that is highly non-Gaussian and non-central. Living with complete certainty from birth
until death at age e0 is more valuable than facing a nonzero probability d of dying in infancy
followed by living with certainty until e0/(1 − d) > e0, even though life expectancy at birth is
exactly the same in either case. This is because the cost of infant mortality outweighs the beneﬁt
of living past e0 due to discounting, the same reason why S10 is costly. Both equations (18) and
(19) will typically overestimate A(ℓ) because each formula omits infant mortality, which has been
and remains high in the developing world. If complete life tables are available, of course, it is
possible to avoid this problem by measuring A(ℓ) exactly. In order to gauge the importance of
life-span uncertainty for convergence, I estimate A(ℓ) and full income using all three methods and
then compare results.
Tables 2 and 3 reproduce their counterparts in Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005) using a
wider sample of 180 countries covering virtually all of the world’s population. Results using only
the original 96 countries examined by Becker, Philipson and Soares are similar and indicate slightly
more convergence than is shown here.34 The top panel in Table 2 shows population weighted
averages of aggregates from life tables and national income accounts for a set of world regions
as deﬁned by the World Bank, for the poorest and richest countries in 1970, and for the world
as a whole, using mortality data from Edwards (2009b) and income data from the Penn World
Table, Maddison (2003), and the IMF. All regions gained income per capita during the interval,
34In general, however, convergence results are not robust to the breadth and quality of the sample, nor to the use of
population weights, and they appear not to have been robust in the original data examined by Becker, Philipson and
Soares (2005) either. Unweighted estimates, which place much more emphasis on the experiences of small countries,
reveal greater inequality in full income than in GDP per capita in 2000. This is true in the broad sample of 180,
in the smaller sample of 96 used by Becker, Philipson and Soares, and it is also true in a subset of 35 countries
with high-quality mortality data drawn from the Human Mortality Database (2009). In the last subsample, which
is dominated by high-income countries, even population-weighted estimates show slightly increased inequality in full
income compared to GDP per capita in 2000. Two factors probably account for these patterns. First, countries that
have been hit hardest by HIV/AIDS tend to be small. Unweighted estimates are therefore likely to overestimate the
impact of the disease on convergence in average human well-being, although they correctly measure the convergence
across countries. Second, because high-quality mortality data is a luxury aﬀordable only to high-income countries,
and income also correlates strongly with the demographic transition, it is not surprising that mortality trends based
only on high-quality data are diﬀerent than those based on a much broader sample. Still, it is troubling that the
basic result, namely increased convergence in full income compared to GDP per capita, seems to hinge on the use
of mortality data of questionable quality. Recent developments in a related literature on income inequality and
population health testify to the inherent dangers (Judge, Mulligan and Benzeval, 1998). Less troubling but still
worthy of note is the ﬁnding that average well-being in small countries seems not to be converging toward that in
large countries, which bears implications for political stability and the continued spread of the demographic transition.
30at an average annual rate of about 1.8 percent worldwide, and all but one gained in terms of life
expectancy, which rose 0.27 year per annum on average. The world standard deviation in adult life
span remained fairly steady, declining only 0.2 year from 17.0 to 16.8. Survivorship to age 10 rose 7
percentage points, from 86.7 to 93.7 percent. Although almost all regions experienced gains against
mortality, there was also clear heterogeneity. Europe and Central Asia, a World Bank category that
does not include the high income European countries, experienced only a very small 0.9 year total
gain in life expectancy and actually suﬀered a small increase in S10, from 15.9 to 16.2, although ℓ10
increased somewhat. Sub-Saharan Africa gained almost 5 years in life expectancy, due to a large
increase in ℓ10, which rose from 74.1 to 82.7 percent. But variance in adult life dropped only 0.4
to 19.4.
The bottom panel of Table 2 translates gains in income and survivorship into gains in the “full
income” measure proposed by Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005) using the three diﬀerent methods
of valuing life span discussed above. When only e0 is used, the annual value of gains is an additional
$800 (in 2000 international dollars) for the world as a whole, and the growth in full income is 2.2
percent, or 0.4 faster than the growth rate of income per capita during the period. Accounting for
both e0 and S10 increases the contributions of mortality gains, to $1,159 and 0.5 percentage point
faster annual growth respectively. Using the entire survivorship schedule including infant mortality
more than doubles the gains, to $1,684 and an extra 0.7 percentage point in annual growth.
The hefty importance these comparisons seem to attach to S10 is odd in light of the relatively
small decrease in world S10 since 1970, and it is in fact misleading. The presence of any S10 at all
raises the value of gains in e0 by increasing their marginal utility. Equation (15) shows this clearly:
the marginal utility of the mean length of life, which appears in the denominator, is a decreasing
function of the mean but an increasing function of the variance, S10
2. When I account for S10 in
addition to e0 in Table 2, I am basically turning variance on after being oﬀ, which has a large eﬀect
on measured trends in well-being even when the trend in variance is negligible.
A more appropriate way to decompose growth in full income into portions attributable to
changes in individual moments is by measuring gains using counterfactual but fully realistic sur-
vivorship curves that hold one or more moments constant over time. Without any change in world
S10, the value of total annual survivorship gains would be about 5 percent lower than the $1,685
we observe in Table 2. This share is similar to what I found in Table 1 for the U.S. after 1950.
31Indeed, average annual declines in S10 for the U.S. since 1950 and for the world since 1970 are
both only around 0.01 to 0.02, a sobering remark on recent progress against high adult variance in
the developing world. Declines in infant and child mortality, on the other hand, have been large
and more prevalent among poor countries (Moser, Shkolnikov and Leon, 2005). To gauge their
importance, I generated a ﬁctitious world survivorship curve for 2000 assuming there was change
since 1970 only in ℓ10, and not in the shape of the life-span distribution above age 10. Based on
this counterfactual, the value of improvements spurred by increases in ℓ10 accounted for more than
75 percent of the total value of gains against mortality.
Heterogeneity across regions in the progress against mortality is certainly evident in the lower
panel in Table 2, where results broadly amplify the patterns reported by Becker, Philipson and
Soares (2005). In dollar terms, the beneﬁts of mortality reduction were felt considerably more
strongly by the richest 50 percent of countries, but growth rates of full income were faster for the
poorest 50 percent because their initial money incomes were so much lower. Sub-Saharan Africa
remains a basket case even when improvements in the entire survivorship curve are priced, raising
growth in full income to only 0.7 percent. But a similar picture emerges for Europe and Central
Asia, where the negative inﬂuence of a slight increase in S10 was more than oﬀset by improvements
in ℓ10, but not by enough to raise growth past 0.9 percent. Elsewhere, economic growth that
was already fairly robust is further enhanced by accounting for improvements in survivorship. In
East Asia and the Paciﬁc, growth in full income is a stout 6.7 percent after accounting for much
improvement in all three mortality statistics, up 0.4 from the e0-only reading. The Middle East,
North Africa, and South Asia beneﬁt the most, about 0.6 percentage point in annual growth, from
accounting for all changes in ℓ(x) as opposed to e0 alone.
Table 3 descends past regions to examine inequality in average human well-being using countries
weighted by population as the unit of observation. By any one of several measures, inequality across
individuals in full income in 2000 is less than inequality in income per capita in 2000 or in 1970.
The Gini coeﬃcient, a widely cited statistic, registers 0.4781 when measured using full income in
2000 derived with countries’ entire ℓ(x) schedules. By comparison, the Gini on per capita income in
2000 was 0.4999. Accounting for successively higher moments of the life-span distribution reinforces
this basic convergence result, as it did among regions in Table 2. Another upshot of the math in
equation (15) is that the value of a given increase in mean life span will be larger when S10 is
32higher, such as in a poor country. Part of what we see here is thus surely the mechanical eﬀect of
S10 and infant mortality raising the measured value of gains in e0 disproportionately more among
poor countries with high variance. But continued global convergence in infant mortality even as
convergence in e0 turned to divergence after 1980 (Moser, Shkolnikov and Leon, 2005), as well as
some limited convergence in S10, are surely also at work.
These results mirror and amplify those of Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005) on convergence in
average human well-being, but some circumspection is in order. Considerably less progress against
mortality in poor but more sparsely populated areas like Sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Europe,
and Central Asia, was not suﬃcient to reduce overall convergence in average human full income
due to considerable progress in larger countries. Still, population-weighted estimates suggest more
convergence in average human well-being since 1970 than in average income alone. Accounting for
gains against life-span variance, either in the form of S10 or infant mortality, strengthens the ﬁndings
of Becker, Philipson and Soares for two reasons. Mechanically speaking, correctly accounting for
even a stable level of variance raises the value of increases in life expectancy, and that eﬀect increases
with the level of variance, which is higher in poor countries. In addition, total variance was also
strongly declining over this period, primarily due to robust declines in infant mortality but also
due to moderate declines in S10. The gains against variance, broadly deﬁned, directly contributed
a large amount to the value of progress against mortality.
4.3.4 A new perspective on the demographic transition
The insights of this paper also suggest a new interpretation of the historical timing of age-speciﬁc
gains against disease and mortality during the demographic and epidemiologic transitions. As
summarized by Wilmoth (2003), the classic transition begins with a decline in infant mortality
and early death, brought about by progress against infectious disease. That is, the ﬁrst stage
of progress drastically lessens the unconditional variance in life spans. The second stage of the
transition is characterized by a shift in focus away from infectious disease and toward treating
chronic degenerative diseases aﬄicting the elderly. This works to lengthen the average adult life
span but probably does not reduce the variance much if at all.
The current framework suggests this sequence was probably optimal, if it were not practically
33required.35 High levels of variance inﬂate its cost considerably. Combating infectious disease re-
duces unconditional variance directly by reducing infant and child mortality, and it also reduces
uncertainty in adult life. Certainly in the context of the modern developing world, in which life
expectancy is short, variance is high, both infectious and chronic diseases claim lives, and tech-
nologies and practices to combat either one are readily available via the developed world, revealed
preference seems to indicate that public health priorities largely center on the unconditional vari-
ance ﬁrst, i.e., infant and premature adult mortality. A possible outlier based on this perspective,
HIV/AIDS is something of a hybrid disease aﬄicting old and young alike.
Historically, these two very diﬀerent stages of the transition produced a seamless pattern of
steady increases in life expectancy at birth over time (Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002), which ﬁts well
with steady growth in per capita incomes (Hall and Jones, 2007) and shows that average health
outcomes were rising consistently. But the technologies, cost structures, and incidence of beneﬁts
during each phase were entirely diﬀerent. How societies set priorities in achieving mortality decline
is a major question. A key insight of this paper, that variance in life span is costlier relative to
mean life span when variance is higher, suggests that declines in variance should precede sustained
progress in the adult mean or mode.36
4.4 Uncertain life span and economic behavior
This paper, like others in the literature on the value of gains against mortality, explores only one
economic perspective on the cost of uncertainty in life span: the willingness to pay. Although
willingness to pay should in principle encompass or account for all expected behavioral responses
to changes in uncertainty, my simple theoretical model only captures the response of consumption
and saving and not other behavioral responses that we think might be very interesting.
35A recent paper posits that contemporary declines in adult mortality are due to earlier declines in childhood
disease and mortality (Finch and Crimmins, 2004), owing to a reduced accumulation of inﬂammatory exposure from
infectious disease. One might infer that sustained mortality decline could happen in no other way. But in many
modern developing countries, infant mortality remains high even though imported medical technologies can reduce
adult mortality. Life expectancy in many such countries has increased (Becker, Philipson and Soares, 2005), although
perhaps not as robustly as in the developed world.
36To be sure, the story must also involve marginal costs, since the socially optimal allocation of resources occurs
where the ratio of marginal utilities is equal to the ratio of marginal costs. Reducing variance through improved
sanitation or other public health initiatives is likely to be much less costly than increasing the adult mean, which
involves treating degenerative diseases.
34Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil (2002) examine the eﬀects of uncertain life span in a model with
endogenous labor supply. Their results suggest that an optimal policy under high uncertainty might
be low saving and working until death, or what macroeconomists might consider extreme rule-of-
thumb as opposed to life-cycle behavior. Patterns in retirement behavior early in the 20th Century
seem to support this view. In contrast, Hurd, Smith and Zissimopoulos (2004) ﬁnd very small
eﬀects of low subjective survivorship probabilities on retirement behavior among older Americans
in the Health and Retirement Study. Education, another form of saving, is also endogenous and
may react to uncertainty in length of life. Building on earlier work by Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and
Weil (2000) that focuses primarily on average length of life, Li and Tuljapurkar (2004) show that
uncertainty has an eﬀect on educational attainment in a general equilibrium setting.
These and other directions are promising avenues for further research. While not a new subﬁeld,
the study of interactions between health, mortality, and economic decision making is likely to pro-
duce results that are of great interest to researchers and policymakers in many ﬁelds, in particular
those of development and health inequality where mortality conditions vary the most.
5 Conclusion
In a standard model of time-separable utility with no bequest motive, uncertainty in life span is
costly when the force of time discounting, δ, which is also approximately the coeﬃcient of absolute
risk aversion in life span, is positive. Even when wealth is fully annuitized, hypothetical individuals
with these preferences are hurt by uncertainty in life span and would be willing to trade away
pS = −δS years of mean life span in return for one less year in standard deviation.
If δ = r = 0.03, the average American would be willing to give up 0.45 life year in return for one
year less in the standard deviation at ages over 10, which is currently about S10 = 15. This is large,
implying that diﬀerences in population health between the U.S. and Sweden are more like 3.2 life
years, or 40 percent higher than the diﬀerence of 2.3 years we ﬁnd in life expectancy alone. In the
thought experiment I posed in the introduction, country A enjoyed M10 = 80 and S10 = 13, while
country B experienced M10 = 78 and S10 = 15, roughly like Sweden and the U.S. today. If the 2
year diﬀerence in average life span were worth $40,000, my results suggest the 2 year diﬀerence in
S10 should be worth about one additional life year, or another $20,000. An unborn baby engaged
35in birthplace arbitrage would be willing to pay $60,000 more to live in Sweden. To be sure, my
approximation of the price of uncertainty, pS = −0.45, is just that, an approximation. Results vary
with diﬀerent assumptions regarding the relative levels of the real interest rate and the rate of time
discounting, and with the characteristics of mortality. But as a rule of thumb, it is a useful and
parsimonious representation of the key idea.
Babies choosing birthplaces would also be remiss not to consider infant mortality, to put it
mildly. Although infant mortality is low in advanced countries today, it was very high during
historical periods and is high in many modern developing countries. Discounting places a very high
cost on infant mortality indeed, making it two to three times more costly than the reduction in
mean length of life it represents. This is because all of the probability weight at play occurs so
early in life, during extremely valuable years. Without accounting for the unconditional variance in
length of life represented by infant deaths, valuing gains in life expectancy at birth will signiﬁcantly
understate the beneﬁt of declining infant mortality.
This framework allows me to assess the contribution of reductions in adult life-span variance and
infant deaths to the overall value of progress against mortality. This decomposition is interesting
because gains against adult variance and infant mortality have largely plateaued in developed
countries, while increases in the mean continue apace. In the U.S., reductions in S10 prior to 1950
were relatively large, falling from 24 in 1900 to 16 by 1950, and they accounted for more than 15
percent of the total value of mortality declines. Since 1950, S10 has declined by only more year,
contributing only about 5 percent to the total value of all progress, which is dominated by increases
in the mean, albeit much decelerated themselves.
This paper also implies that health inequality is typically larger between countries than is
implied by life expectancy alone, because the level of life-span uncertainty is often diﬀerent as well.
In particular, poor countries typically experience much higher levels of adult variance in length of
life than do rich countries, in addition to their lower life expectancies. If we account for variance,
global health inequality must be higher than we would perceive it based on the inequality in life
expectancy alone. But in a dynamic setting, the importance of variance in length of life manifests
itself somewhat diﬀerently. Purely methodological insights are that the presence of some variance
increases the measured value of a given improvement in life expectancy, the value is increasing
in the variance, and poor countries experience higher variance and thus larger gains from a given
36change in life expectancy. Worldwide, moderate declines in adult variance combined with broad-
based reductions in infant mortality, the larger source of unconditional variance in human life span,
have produced much global convergence in average human well-being. These ﬁndings amplify those
in the pioneering work of Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005), who due to data limitations could
only consider life expectancy.
Several limitations constrain the scope of this paper. I do not account for education or for
physical capital, both of which are considered in a general equilibrium setting by Li and Tuljapurkar
(2004). I also do not consider the cost of variation in morbidity, or the quality of life. Bequests
are a potentially key omission, because they could signiﬁcantly reduce the marginal disutility of
life-span uncertainty. But even if bequests were intended, which is unclear, they would also reduce
the marginal utility of mean life span, leaving an ambiguous eﬀect on the price of life-span variance
relative to the mean. I also make no allowance for the special psychology that we know surrounds
death (Slemrod, 2003). One could argue that knowing the precise date of death is actually not a
good, at least in terms of emotional beneﬁt, and rather that some uncertainty is preferable. Still,
the economic cost of uncertain length of life in terms of retirement and estate planning is real and
plausibly much larger. I leave issues of the emotional costs of uncertain life span to future research
in this nascent subﬁeld. Many questions remain about time discounting and its relationship to
risk preferences over periods of life, and I have made no attempt to investigate these issues here.
Bommier (2006) posits a model of preferences over consumption and life span with a free parameter
governing risk aversion over life span. In their study of 30 women in perfect health asked to rank
lotteries over life span, Verhoef, Haan and van Daal (1994) report evidence supporting prospect
theory: risk-seeking behavior over small gambles and risk aversion over large. I intend my estimate
of the cost of uncertain life span to be a provocative motivation for further research into this topic.
The implication for policy is that uncertainty in length of life is costly and should be targeted
when it is high, whether in entire countries or among speciﬁc subgroups. Since its cost rises with
its level, and since the level of uncertainty also diminishes the value of gains in life expectancy,
policies that reduce uncertainty should be favored over those that increase average length of life
when uncertainty is high. A provocative interpretation of this bottom line is that a high-variance
country like the U.S. may stand to gain by focusing more on spreading the existing beneﬁts of
health treatments and technology more broadly across its citizens, at the expense of investing in
37discovery of new treatments and technology that extend life. Given the key role attached to U.S.
pharmaceutical innovation in driving old-age mortality decline worldwide (Lichtenberg, 2007), a
refocusing would not come without cost. A somewhat less provocative implication is that developing
countries are better served by attacking the causes of high uncertainty ﬁrst, infectious diseases and
infant mortality, before extending assistance that extends life for adults. In large part, development
assistance is already conﬁgured to do this.
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44Table 1: Changes in U.S. life expectancy, adult life-span variance, and survivorship since 1900
1900 1950 2000
Life expectancy, e0 47.7 68.4 76.7
Std. dev. in adult life span, S10 24.0 16.0 14.9
Survivorship to age 10, ℓ10 0.782 0.963 0.991
1900-2000 1900-1950 1950-2000
[1] Average S10 19.5 20.0 15.4
[2] Average pS 0.58 0.60 0.46
[3] Change in S10, ∆S10 9.1 8.0 1.1
[4] Life year beneﬁt of ∆S10, [2] × [3] 5.3 4.8 0.5
[5] Average ℓ10 0.886 0.872 0.977
[6] Life year beneﬁt weighted by average ℓ10, [4] × [5] 4.7 4.2 0.5
[7] Change in life expectancy, ∆e0 29.0 20.7 8.3
[8] Total improvement in life years, [6] + [7] 33.7 24.9 8.8
[9] Share due to ∆S10, [6] ÷ [8] 0.140 0.169 0.056
Notes: Demographic data are simple averages of sex-speciﬁc period life tables presented by Bell and Miller (2005)
and are based on age-speciﬁc mortality rates measured in the given year. Life expectancy at birth, e0, is the average
number of years lived. S10 is the standard deviation of length of life conditional on survivorship to age 10. The price
of S10 in terms of mean life years is given by pS = −δS10, as described in the text, where it is assumed that δ = 0.03
in all periods.
45Table 2: Value of survivorship gains by region of the world and groups of countries, 1970–2000
1970 2000
Life Life Survi- GDP Life Life Survi- GDP
exp. std. dev. vorship per exp. std. dev. vorship per
e0 S10 ℓ10 capita e0 S10 ℓ10 capita
East Asia & Paciﬁc 58.3 16.4 0.871 695 69.7 15.1 0.959 3,908
Europe & Central Asia 67.3 15.9 0.947 5,498 68.2 16.2 0.970 6,838
High income 70.6 15.0 0.971 12,951 77.7 14.4 0.992 25,954
Latin America & Caribbean 60.4 16.8 0.881 4,839 71.5 16.7 0.965 7,085
Middle East & North Africa 53.7 17.9 0.822 3,202 67.7 15.2 0.947 4,569
South Asia 47.8 17.7 0.757 1,183 60.9 17.1 0.898 2,510
Sub-Saharan Africa 45.8 19.8 0.741 1,565 50.7 19.4 0.827 1,667
Poorest 50% countries in 1970 53.6 17.4 0.820 1,098 64.1 16.8 0.919 3,326
Richest 50% countries in 1970 67.9 15.6 0.948 10,105 73.4 16.0 0.978 17,024
World 58.8 17.0 0.867 4,360 66.9 16.8 0.937 7,505
Value of survivorship gains in Yearly growth rate of full
annual income calculated with: income (%) calculated with:
only e0 e0 and S10 entire ℓ(x) only e0 e0 and S10 entire ℓ(x)
East Asia & Paciﬁc 477 720 987 6.3 6.5 6.7
Europe & Central Asia 60 54 281 0.8 0.8 0.9
High income 2,035 2,766 3,343 2.6 2.7 2.8
Latin America & Caribbean 926 1,299 2,009 1.7 1.8 2.1
Middle East & North Africa 838 1,474 1,903 1.8 2.1 2.4
South Asia 438 699 877 3.1 3.4 3.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 105 197 235 0.4 0.6 0.7
Poorest 50% countries in 1970 425 651 865 4.2 4.4 4.6
Richest 50% countries in 1970 1,067 1,290 2,020 2.0 2.0 2.1
World 800 1,159 1,684 2.2 2.3 2.5
Notes: The sample is comprised of 180 countries including Taiwan, which is placed in the high income group.
Regions are otherwise as deﬁned by the World Bank, and regional averages are weighted by population. GDP per
capita is measured in 2000 international prices, adjusted for terms of trade. Measures are collected from the Penn
World Table, Maddison (2003), and the IMF. Life expectancy at birth, e0, the standard deviation of length of life
above age 10, S10, survivorship to age 10, ℓ10, and the entire ℓ(x) distributions are derived from oﬃcial data and
estimates collected by Edwards (2009b). The value of life expectancy gains and full income are based on the author’s
calculations using the methodology and parameter values of Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005) and 1970 as the
base year, and they are calculated three ways. When only e0 is used, survivorship is assumed to be 1 until dropping
to zero at age e0. When e0 and S10 are used, deaths are assumed to be distributed normally around a mean of e0.
When the entire ℓ(x) curve is used, the survivorship schedule is fully realistic and reﬂects everything: the mean, the
spike in deaths due to infant and child mortality, the old-age hump, and all its skewness and kurtosis.
46Table 3: Evolution of cross-country inequality in full income, 1970–2000
Full income in 2000
Income per capita calculated with:
1970 2000 e0 only e0 and S10 entire ℓ(x)
Relative mean deviation 0.4816 0.4227 0.4117 0.4038 0.3970
Coeﬃcient of variation 1.2041 1.1801 1.1524 1.1342 1.1076
Std. dev. of logs 1.2216 0.9910 0.9874 0.9791 0.9819
Gini coeﬃcient 0.5439 0.4999 0.4904 0.4836 0.4781
Regression to the mean since 1970 −0.3507 −0.3681 −0.3805 −0.3872
Notes: See notes to Table 2. Inequality measures are weighted by country population. Regression to the mean is
the coeﬃcient from a weighted OLS regression of the change in the natural log of income over the period on its initial
logged level, with 1970 populations as weights. All four regression coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level.
47Figure 1: The distribution of life spans, survivorship, and log mortality in the U.S. in 1900 and
2000






























































































Source: Bell and Miller (2005) and author’s calculations. These data are unweighted averages of sex-speciﬁc life-table
entries. In panel A, the density of deaths at age 0 was 0.1328.
48Figure 2: Average life span, e0, and the standard deviation of adult life span, S10 in Sweden since
1750
























































































Source: Author’s calculations and Human Mortality Database (2009).
49Figure 3: The price of S, a standard deviation in life span, in terms of mean life span as a function
of δ when r = 0.03 and life span is normally distributed














































































Analytical model, annuities, r = 0.03
Numerical model, annuities, r = 0.03
Numerical model, no annuities, r = 0.03
Notes: The thick black line shows pS, the price of a standard deviation in life span in terms of mean life span, as a
function of δ for the simple analytical model when the standard deviation of life span, S = 15.66, the level prevailing
in the U.S. in 1994, and when r = 0.03. In the simple analytical model, when consumption is ﬁxed, pS = −δS. The
thin solid line shows the locus in the full numerical model with complete annuitization of wealth. The dashed line
depicts the locus in the model with no annuities.
50Figure 4: The price of S, a standard deviation in life span, in terms of mean life span as a function
of r when δ = 0.03 and life span is normally distributed

















































































Analytical model, annuities, δ = 0.03
Numerical model, annuities, δ = 0.03
Numerical model, no annuities, δ = 0.03
Notes: The thick black line shows pS, the price of a standard deviation in life span in terms of mean life span, as a
function of r for the simple analytical model when the standard deviation of life span, S = 15.66, the level prevailing
in the U.S. in 1994, and when δ = 0.03. In the simple analytical model, when consumption is ﬁxed, pS = −δS. The
thin solid line shows the locus in the full numerical model with complete annuitization of wealth. The dashed line
depicts the locus in the model with no annuities.
51Figure 5: The price of S, a standard deviation in life span, in terms of mean life span as a function
of δ when r = 0.03, adult survivorship is realistic, but there is no infant mortality














































































Analytical model, annuities, r = 0.03
Numerical model, annuities, real adult survivorship, r = 0.03
Numerical model, no annuities, real adult survivorship, r = 0.03
Notes: The thick black line shows pS, the price of a standard deviation in life span in terms of mean life span, as a
function of r for the simple analytical model when the standard deviation of life span, S = 15.66, the level prevailing
in the U.S. in 1994, and when δ = 0.03. In the simple analytical model, when consumption is ﬁxed, pS = −δS.
The thin solid line shows the locus in the full numerical model with complete annuitization of wealth. The dashed
line depicts the locus in the model with no annuities. In this simulation, the survivorship weights are taken from a
modiﬁed period life table for the U.S. in 1999, provided by the Human Mortality Database (2009). Life-table deaths
at ages under 10 are set to equal deaths at age 10, and the entire distribution is rescaled to sum to unity.
52Figure 6: The price of S, a standard deviation in life span, in terms of mean life span as a function
of δ when r = 0.03 and survivorship is fully realistic, with infant mortality














































































Analytical model, annuities, r = 0.03
Numerical model, annuities, real survivorship, r = 0.03
Numerical model, no annuities, real survivorship, r = 0.03
Notes: The thick black line shows pS, the price of a standard deviation in life span in terms of mean life span, as a
function of r for the simple analytical model when the standard deviation of life span, S = 15.66, the level prevailing
in the U.S. in 1994, and when δ = 0.03. In the simple analytical model, when consumption is ﬁxed, pS = −δS.
The thin solid line shows the locus in the full numerical model with complete annuitization of wealth. The dashed
line depicts the locus in the model with no annuities. In this simulation, the survivorship weights are taken from a
modiﬁed period life table for the U.S. in 1999, provided by the Human Mortality Database (2009). Life-table deaths
at ages under 10 are set to equal deaths at age 10, and the entire distribution is rescaled to sum to unity.
53Figure 7: The standard deviation in life span above age 10 in the U.S. by year and by birth cohort












































































10 by year of birth
Notes: The underlying data are historical and forecast life table death distributions taken from Bell and Miller
(2005). The standard deviation in life span above age 10, S10, is calculated as described by Edwards and Tuljapurkar
(2005).
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